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Rosacker and Metcalf: Investment Tax Credit

UNITED STATES FEDERAL TAX POLICY SURROUNDING THE

INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT: A REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
INTENT AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS

OVER THIRTY YEARS (1962-1991)*
by
ROBERT

E.

ROSACKER**

RICHARD W. METCALF***

INTRODUCTION

Congress enacts tax legislation amidst numerous concerns beyond mere
revenue raising. Significant congressional tax policy consideration is conferred
upon social objectives, equity concerns, administrative matters, and macroeconomic goals. Within the purview of macro-economic goals can be found
federal tax policy relating to investments in fixed assets - which assets are
depreciable, the allowable depreciation methods, depreciable lives, and the
investment tax credit. Federal tax policy concerning the investment tax credit
(ITC) is the topic of this article.'
First proposed and legislated during the administration of President
Kennedy, the ITC was designed as a method for spurring expansion and
modernization of the nation's productive facilities. 2 Although originally foreseen
as a permanent component of federal tax law,3 it has been far from immutable.
5
Since its original enactment (1962), 4 the credit has been suspended (1966),
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I
The ITC is a nonrefundable reduction in a taxpayer's federal tax bill granted for undertaking certain
fixed asset investment behavior deemed desirable by Congress. For example, if a firm invested in a
$100,000 piece of machinery qualifying for an ITC of ten percent, the firm could reduce its tax bill in the
year of acquisition by an amount equal to $10,000. Additionally, if the earned ITC is not fully utilized in
the current year, any unused portion may operate, under extensive carryover rules, to provide a refund for
?ast income taxes paid and/or a decrease in amounts due under future tax returns.
Special Message to the Congress: Program for Economic Growth and Recovery, 1967 Pun. PAPERS
41,51.
3
Joel Barlow, Effects of the Investment Credit and Depreciation Allowances on Business Expansion,
1967 NATLTAX AssoC. - PROCEEDINGS 139, 145.
4
Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
5
Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508 (1966) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (1967)).
*
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reinstated (1967),6 repealed (1969), 7 and reincarnated (197 1);8 the rate of credit has
been increased (1975)9 and effectively increased (1981); 10 and, most recently, it
was repealed for a second time (1986). 11 Further, in a continuation of this timehonored tradition of change, President Bush proposed legislation calling for a new
and enhanced version of the venerable ITC. 12 The diverse explanations for such an
on-again, off-again history run the gamut from the simple (push-pull of the
political process) to the complex (a perceived desirable/undesirable relationship
with inflation). Yet, throughout all the varying rationales, subsuming all manner
of reasoning, flows the notion that Congress and the President discern some
favorable macro-economic benefits from ongoing alterations in this tax policy.
The massive Tax Reform Act of 1986,13 which encompasses the latest
legislative modification to ITC policy (repeal), left intact the statutory ITC
framework.1 4 The primary rationale for this action appears related to non-repeal of
the historic buildings tax credit. L5 However, the existence of this framework
allows one to speculate upon the future of the ITC. Given an ITC framework and
past congressional behavior, can it be long before the ITC returns as an active
federal tax policy? In that event, is a subsequent repeal or suspension an unlikely
possibility? If the past is an indicator of the future, 1TC policy will remain an issue
for debate, discussion, and legislative action. Therefore, an historical exposition of
prior legislative intent and empirical research findings over thirty years of varying
tax policy choices is important as a means for facilitating future consideration and
evaluation of ITC policy options.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: First, a brief
description of the ITC framework is offered; second, the ITC is chronicled from its
ideological foundations in the 1950s through repeal under the Tax Reform Act of
198616 in order to gain an historical perspective on legislative intent; third,
significant empirical studies concerning ITC effectiveness in modifying targeted
investment behavior are reviewed; and last, conclusions are tendered in support of
6
Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (1967).
7
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter Reform Act of 19691.
s
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter Revenue Act of 1971].
9
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter Tax Reduction Act of 1975].
l0
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter Recovery Act of 1981].
I
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [Hereinafter Reform Act of 19861.
12
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 173 (Jan. 28, 1992).
13 Reform Act of 1986, supra note 11.
14 1.R.C. §§ 38, 46-49 (West 1988).
15 I.R.C. § 46(a)(3) (West 1988).
16 Reform Act of 1986, supranote 11.
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the ITC as an effective incentive that should have a significant role in future tax
policy.
FEDERAL INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT

The ITC was developed to stimulate economic development and facilitate
stability by way of capital construction.
The investment tax credit is, in effect, a subsidy provided by the
Federal Government through the tax system to encourage
investment activity. As such, the investment tax credit involves the
transfer of funds from the Government to the private sector. The
Government does not send a check to the business firm reimbursing
it for a portion of its capital investment, but the Treasury
Department does forego some of the revenue that it otherwise
would have collected. This foregone revenue represents the cost of
the programs. The benefits are the investment expenditures required
7
to achieve the short-run stability and long-run growth.'
Simply stated, the ITC is a tax reward mechanism developed to encourage sectors
of the economy which are perceived to be in need of additional capital by
permitting taxpayers to drastically reduce or eliminate their income tax liabilities as
remuneration for participating in targeted business investments.
Targeted investment activities are designated in the statutory framework of
the Internal Revenue Code wherein a taxonomy of three credits may be found:
regular, rehabilitation, and energy. The first credit is granted for expenditures on
depreciable personalty (e.g., cars, computers, furniture, office equipment, and
production machinery). '8 Urban recovery and the restoration of older buildings are
emphasized with the second credit. 19 The third credit encourages alternative energy
sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and ocean thermal. 2 In order
to limit the scope of this research, this article is confined to the effectiveness of the
regular ITC.
Two rationales underlie a normative belief concerning ITC effectiveness: (1)
Reducing one's income tax liability is, by itself, quite appealing, and (2) allowance
of a tax reduction effectively adds economic viability to an investment by lessening
the aggregate expenditure and increasing the rate of return. In a logical sense, if the
incentive is satisfactory, taxpayers can be expected to respond in a positive manner.
'7

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE No. PAD-

78-40, INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT: UNRESOLVED ISSUES 2 (1978).
18
I.R.C. § 46(a)(1) (West 1988).
19
'D

I.R.C. § 46(a)(3) (West 1988).
I.R.C. § 46(a)(2) (West 1988).
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At the same time, the repeal of a previously allowed credit, a policy counter to
enactment, would be expected to foreshadow a decrease in targeted investments.
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE

21

An examination of the prismatic, discordant history of the ITC proves

helpful in eliciting an understanding of its nature as an investment incentive and the
legislative intent leading to enactments of the various policy choices. Further,

analysis of the divergent rationales offered in support of enactment, reenactment,
rate changes, and repeals sheds light on the perceived effects of the various ITC

policies, thus facilitating a more insightful interpretation of empirical research
findings.
Economic Foundations
During the 1950s, the United States economy began to awaken from the
economic euphoria generated by the abundant consumer demand which followed
World War II. The unpleasant realities of economic stagnation became pervasive,
proving wholly unsettling to United States economic mavens.
It was generally recognized by economists, government planners,
and other concerned individuals that the United States had to do
something to make its industrial capacity and output more efficient
and more competitive.... It was feared that unless the competitive
position were to improve, demand would increasingly be supplied
by foreign producers .... Therefore, because of the low level of
domestic demand, lagging employment, and accelerated growth in
foreign countries, a sense of urgency existed calling for an increase
in the rates of growth and investment. 2
While many people eloquently argued the need for investment stimuli, one author,
E. Cary Brown, suggested a potentially promising catalyst for increased
investment growth. Brown elucidated the notion of a tax credit for investment as a
stimulus alternative to accelerated depreciation in a report to the Subcommittee on
Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report in 1955.23 At the

For a comprehensive historical summary of the legislative process concerning the ITC from 1945
through 1977, see Clyde L. Posey, An Historical Analysis of the Events Leading to the Establishment of
the Investment Tax Credit and Its Modificaiton through June 30, 1977 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Oklahoma State University).
22
David M. Maloney, A Study of the Association of the Inventment Tax Credit with Investment
S2 pending 24 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).

21

?STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REP., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. FEDERAL TAX POLICY
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABIIrY 495 (JOINT COMM. PRINT 1955). (Compellation of papers

submitted by panelists appearing before the subcommittee on Tax Policy).
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time, the ITC idea was novel although not original, some argue, as a similar tax
credit had been adopted in Belgium in 1954.24
Policy Recommendation
The concept of an ITC saw fruition during the earliest days of the Kennedy
Administration. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Stanley S. Surrey, advocated
the credit as an investment incentive in a tax policy report presented to the newly elected President prior to his inauguration.1 President Kennedy endorsed the
concept in a message presented to the Congress on February 2, 196126 and,
subsequently, incorporated a rather complex, three-tiered ITC recommendation in
his proposal for tax reform delivered to Congress on April 20, 1961.27

Legislative Convocations
Congressional hearings in regard to the President's tax proposal were
convened during mid-1961. Proponents of the incentive advanced arguments that
vested the ITC as a pathway to increased economic growth and investment.2
Opponents argued a pressing need for depreciation reform, economic
discrimination, complexity, uncertainty concerning tenure and rate, discriminatory
exclusion of certain groups (particularly utilities), and last, though certainly not
least, the lack of a Treasury Department monograph in support of the premise
advanced by the ITC concept. "
Two of the opposition arguments demanded resolution if the ITC was to
emerge - depreciation reform and complexity. To resolve the former issue and
placate depreciation reform advocates, the Administration issued recommendations
supporting extensive depreciation revisions. 30 The complexity issue was settled by
House committee substitution of a flat rate credit. 31 Removal of these two
significant barriers paved the way for a tax bill containing provisions enacting an
ITC to clear the House Ways and Means Committee on March 12, 1962.

24
25
26
27
29

William H. White, Illusions in the MarginalInvestment Subsidy, 15 NATL TAX J. 26 (1962).
Posey, supra note 21, at 47.
Special Message to the Congress: Program for Economic Growth and Recovery, supra note 2, at 51.
Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 290, 292.
Posey, supra note 21, at 46, 56-57.
Id. at 47-52.

30

Id at 54.

31
M

Congress Enacts Major Tax Law Revisions, 18 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 478 (1962).
H.R. 10650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

28
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Enactment: January 1, 1962
Following extensive debate and requisite modifications, the ITC became law
on October 16, 1962, with passage of the Revenue Act of 1962.31 The allowable
credit was seven percent (three percent for most public utilities) of the cost of
qualifying assets acquired after January 1, 1962. 34 The full credit was available for
qualifying assets with depreciable lives of at least eight years, 35 while a reduced
credit was allowed for qualifying assets with useful lives of four to eight years.36
On the negative side, the "Long Amendment" 37 required a reduction to the
depreciable basis of qualifying assets by an amount equal to the potential ITC.38
The ITC gained expanded legislative and administrative support after its
enactment. First, the legislature enacted the Revenue Act of 1964 3 repealing the
onerous requirements of the "Long Amendment." Second, the Treasury
Department reacted to the perceived success of the ITC by attempting to extend the
concept into several other arenas, most notably, investments in certain
underdeveloped countries. "0
Suspension: October 10, 1966
United States military involvement in the Vietnam War expanded
throughout 1965 and 1966, culminating in aggravated inflationary pressures within
the United States economy. A new course of action in federal tax policy was
indicated. In response, Congress enacted the Investment Credit and Accelerated
Depreciation Suspension Act of 196641 suspending the ITC from October 10,
1966, to December 31, 1967. 2
The purpose here, of course, is not so much to raise revenue as to
moderate the economy to a more sustainable level of growth. In
other words, we are trying to build new plants and machine tools Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 4. Pub. L. No. 87-834.
Id. § 2(b)(46)(a)(1), 76 Stat. 960, 962.
Id § 2(b)(46)(c)(2), 76 Stat. 960, 962.
36
Id
37 Robert D. Novak, Senate Panel Votes Tax Revisions, But Bill Is FarFrom Kennedy Bill, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 1, 1962, at 3. The "Long Amendment" required taxpayers to reduce their depreciable basis in assets
qualifying for the ITC by an amount equal to the credit claimed. The direct consequences of this
33
34
35

adjustment are two-fold: (1)smaller aggregate depreciation deductions throughout an asset's life lowers
the tax benefit derived from the ITC by a taxpayer and (2) fewer depreciation deductions facilitates lower
estimates of lost revenue anticipated to accompany enactment of an ITC (of considerable interest to and
motivation for Senator Long).
38

Revenue Act of 1962, supra note 4, § 4(b)(48)(g)(1).

39 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).

40
Robert Metz, Treasury Plans Tax Incentives to Spur Foreign Investment, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 22, 1964,
at 51; U.S. Tax Treaty With India Has 7% Investment Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1965, at 51.

41
42

Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1508 (1966) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57 (1967)).
Id § l(a). Pub. L. No. 89-800 § l(a), 80 Stat. 1508-09.
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and acquire them from abroad, as well as from within this country
43
- at too rapid a rate at this time.
However, substantially decreased investment expenditures in certain industries
(e.g., railroads) during the early months of suspension resulted in an early
termination of the suspension on March 10, 1967.44
FirstRepeal: April 21, 1969
Forces opposed to the ITC gathered momentum during the early days of
1969. They portrayed the credit as primarily responsible for inflation or, worse
yet, as merely a tax loophole. Congressman Reuss, in a speech delivered to the
House entitled "One of the Best Ways to Fight Inflation and Plug Tax Loopholes:
Repeal the Seven Percent Investment Tax Credit," stated:
An economic analysis of the investment credit will, I am convinced,
prove that it contributes to instability in the long term as well as in
the short; that it may very well encourage the export of capital; and
that it encourages inflationary potentials of the economy whenever
the economy tends to approach high employment levels as in recent
45
years.
Representative Vanik added his support for repeal of the ITC by proclaiming:
"The seven percent investment credit is the most troublesome tax loophole in
existence today. There is no better way to 'modify the inflationary psychology' of
46
which the President complains. ,
President Nixon, apparently in agreement with the views of these members
of Congress, as well as others, recommended a permanent repeal of the ITC on
April 21, 1969. 47 The President's support was unconditional although it was
certainly politically interwoven with his desire to abrogate the surtax in effect at that
time.48 His recommendation would become reality as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 4 signed into law on December 30, 1969.
The remarks of two influential Congressmen, each on opposite ends of this
argument, provide insight. Representative Patman, Chairman of the Joint
Economic Committee, on why this committee supported repeal, declared:
43
44
45
46
47

112 C ONG. REC. 26850, 26853 (1966) (statement of Sen. Long).
Pub. L. No. 90-26 § 1, 81 Stat. 57-58 (1967).
115 CONG.REC. 1821-22 (1969).
115 CONG.REC. 8505 (1969).
Special Message to the Congress on Reform of the Federal Tax System, 1969 PUB. PAPERS 310,

312
48
49

d.at313.
Reform
Act of 1969, supranote 7.
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First. The rate of expenditure on plant and equipment is and has
been excessive. In the face of a sharply lower operating rate of less
than 84 percent in manufacturing, business has reported plans for
increasing investment outlays this year by 13 to 14 percent. Even
more is planned for 1970-72, according to the McGraw-Hill survey.
Second. The investment tax credit promotes the business cycle,
encouraging larger swings in activity instead of damping down
fluctuations as good tax policy should.
Third. The credit distorts business incentives, encouraging
investment in lower paying projects which business should not be
undertaking either from the standpoint of its own long-term rate of
return on capital or from the social viewpoint of encouraging a high
productivity economy.
Fourth. The investment tax credit tends to promote inflation since it
encourages excessive investment in boom years and then requires
that additional demand stimulus be provided in the resulting
recessions if unemployment is to be cured.
Fifth. Business has an adequate flow of funds to finance its
investments even without this credit, hence this device may be
causing excess funds to flow abroad, worsening the balance of
payments.
Sixth. At a time when ... we face extension of the 10 percent
surtax, the investment tax credit costs the Treasury a revenue loss of
at least $3 billion per year.
Seventh. The investment tax credit is very discriminatory and if the
time ever comes that a demand stimulus is needed again, the
appropriate course would be a tax cut for consumers. s°
Congressman Ullman, a future Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, in opposition to ITC repeal, foreshadowed a subsequent reenactment
when he stated:
[W]e are making a very sad mistake today by repealing the
investment tax credit. The investment tax credit is not a tax
loophole.

'0

115 CONo.REC. 13286-87 (1969).
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On the contrary, if you will recall when we instituted the investment
tax credit, it was a tax reform measure. It was designed to bring
growth into a stagnant economy. It was designed to gain revenue
and not to lose revenue. I predict it is not going to be very many
months before we will very desperately need the investment tax
credit.
When you are voting for this bill, you are voting to repeal... one of
the finest vehicles for growth ... ever invented in the American
51
economy.
Reenactment: August 15, 1971
Representative Ullman is deserving of the highest marks as a tax policy
prognosticator. The ITC, like the mythical Arabian phoenix, would ascend from
the charred ashes of its Congressional funeral pyre. President Nixon provided the
needed legislative catalyst on August 15, 1971, by proposing enactment of a "jobs
development credit."2 The name was new; however, the concept was, without a
doubt, the venerable ITC - an incentive to "invest in new machinery and
equipment that will create new jobs for Americans."
Tax hearings were assembled in both bodies of Congress. The testimony
presented, both for and against the proposed reenactment, was for the most part
old, repetitive, and all too familiar. In light of this lack of fresh evidence, the
wisdom of convening these forums, and in particular, redundant forums, is open
to question. Yet, for better or worse, the views of all concerned parties must be
aired. Clearly, future policy changes involving the ITC, whether suspension,
repeal, rate change, or reenactment, will not be spared an analogous procedure.
Following its hearings, the House Ways and Means Committee reported
legislation containing a jobs development credit to the floor. "4The accompanying
report offered three reasons in support of the credit. It would:
(1) create jobs by encouraging expenditures on machinery and
equipment.
(2) combat inflation by increasing the flow of goods into the
marketplace.

115CONG.REC. 17799 (1969).
Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The Challenge of Peace," PUB. PAPERS
886-87 (Aug. 15, 1971).
53 Id. at 887.
54 Revenue Act of 1971, supra note 8.
51
52
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55
(3) have a positive influence on the balance of payments.

Significantly, Item 2 purports a position contrary to that advocated as the principal
reason supporting ITC repeal in 1969. In a similar fashion, the Senate Finance
Committee concluded that the credit:
should be restored as a means of providing stimulus to the lagging
domestic economy by reducing the cost of capital to U. S.
manufacturers. This [would] also serve to place them in a more
competitive position with foreign manufacturers and in that manner
[would] 56help improve our present serious balance-of-payments
situation.
With President Nixon's backing, 57 and considerable legislative support, the jobs
development credit became law with passage of the Revenue Act of 1971 .5
Rate Increase:January21, 1975
The three years preceding 1975 witnessed an agreeable lull in legislative
activity surrounding the ITC. During 1972, with the Democratic platform
advocating repeal of the ITC, President Nixon, a supporter of the ITC concept,
soared to an overwhelming re-election victory. Shortly thereafter, the President,
the American people, and the world were overcome by the disgraceful, senseless
crimes known as Watergate. A legislative catalepsy ensued with little meaningful
government business transpiring during 1973 and 1974.
In 1975, as the United States emerged from the depths of Watergate, it
entered a period of unprecedented economic upheaval. Inflation and the policies of
OPEC undermined the very fabric of the American economic system. In this
corrosive atmosphere, President Ford proposed increasing the statutory ITC rate to
12 percent. 5 Congress responded by introducing a plethora of ITC rate change

5
HR. REP. NO. 533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825.
S. REP. NO. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1931.
56
57
President Nixon's support for ITC enactment in 1971 was directly opposed to his desire for repeal in
1969. Yet, in each situation, he appeared merely to follow the politically appropriate course. In the first
instance, as a newly elected Republican president, with a platform advocating an end to the Vietnam

War, perhaps he saw his support for repeal as an action that would not alienate the Democratic majority in
Congress who strongly desired repeal and whose support he needed for his war efforts and tax reforms (in
particular, removal of the income tax surtax in effect at that time). In the second instance, with the
recession of 1971, continuing war efforts, and an election in the near future, perhaps he viewed support for
ITC reenactment, especially if it had a different name, the jobs development credit, as the politically

astute course of action.

58
Revenue Act of 1971, supra note 8.
59
Address to the Nation on Energy and Economic Programs, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 30, 32; Address Before
a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 36, 37-38.
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bills;6° however, the legislators seemed, for the most part, to support a smaller
increase in the ITC rate.
Representative Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, authored a bill recommending an increase in the ITC rate to ten
percent. 61 This bill would become the forerunner to three significant legislative
enactments regarding the ITC rate structure. First, as a temporary measure, the
Tax Reduction Act of 197562 increased the rate to ten percent; 63 next, the temporary
increase was extended in the Tax Reform Act of 1976; 6 and last, codification of a
permanent ten percent rate occurred in the Revenue Act of 1978.6 The House
Ways and Means Committee report concerning the Tax Reform Act of 1976
stated:
The temporary liberalization of the investment tax credit provided by
the 1975 Tax Reduction Act was adopted for two reasons. First,
encouraging investment in new equipment, and modernization of
existing facilities was thought to improve the long-run ability of the
economy to achieve economic growth without inflationary pressure.
Second, increasing aggregate demand in the short-run was
considered to be an important part of the program for recovery from
the worst recession in more than two decades.
Since the beginning of 1975, investment plans have been repeatedly
reduced, and planned expenditures in new plant and equipment are
expected to be 10 percent lower in 1975 as compared to 1974.
Because of the need to provide greater certainty to investors about
the availability of the credit in the future, and the need to provide a
continuing stimulus to the economy, the 10 percent investment tax
credit was extended four additional years. (6
Under parallel rationales, Congress deemed it prudent to make the higher ITC rate
permanent. 67

(0
61
2

Posey, supra note 21, at 171.
H.R. 3148, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, supra note 9.

6'
64

Pub. L. No. 94-12 § 301, 89 Stat. 26-27.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 26 U.S.C.).
65
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
65
67

HR. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 188, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3081-82.
S. REP. NO. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439.
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Effective Rate Increase:January 1, 1981
The unostentatious legislative ambience of the Carter years faded into
history, replaced by the piranha-like parliamentary frenzy of the Reagan
Administration. Immediately upon assuming the presidency, President Reagan, a
sincere, faithful proponent of supply-side, "laissez faire," economic theory,
proposed a drastic tax reform agenda.
[T]he Administration is proposing a national recovery plan to
reverse the debilitating combination of sustained inflation and
economic distress .... Were we to stay with existing policies, the
results would be predictable: a rising government presence in the
economy, more inflation, stagnating productivity, and higher
unemployment. Indeed, there is reason to fear that if we remain on
this course, our economy may suffer even more calamitously.
A key component of President Reagan's proposed reform was the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) - a complete, comprehensive
overhaul of depreciation allowances.
The present depreciation system is obsolete, needlessly complex,
and economically unproductive. Very simply, it bases depreciation
of plant machinery and vehicles and tools on their original cost, with
no recognition of how inflation has increased their cost.
We are proposing a much shorter write-off time than is presently
allowed - we propose a five-year write-off for machinery, three
years for vehicles and trucks, and a ten-year write-off for plants.6
The Administration offered as primary support for legislative enactment of ACRS
depreciation:
Acceleration of capital allowances is a key measure to improve
incentives for business investments as a foundation for increased
productivity and sustained economic growth. In recent years, the
real value of depreciation allowances has been greatly eroded by
inflation at the same time that the country's capital needs have
become more urgent. Adoption of this proposal will reduce

ff
RONALD REAGAN. AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY 15
(1981).
6
Id a7.
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substantially the burden of Federal Income Taxes on the return to
investing in business plant and equipment. )
Further, since the ITC is statutorily intermingled with the depreciation network of
the Internal Revenue Code, adoption of ACRS would necessitate changing the
ITC.
ACRS retains the rules of present law governing the character of
property eligible for the credit. It does, however, change the rules..

Under ACRS, a full regular ten percent investment tax credit is
allowed for all eligible 10-year and 5-year personal property and a
7
six percent credit is allowed for all eligible 3-year property. '
ACRS depreciation and the new requirements concerning the ITC became
law under the Economic Recovery Act of 1981.2 These provisions permitted
property that previously had not qualified for the ITC, as a result of a short
depreciable life, now to qualify;73 as such, adoption of the ACRS depreciation
system constituted an effective rate increase in the ITC.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198274 codified provisions
aimed at dampening the perceived over-stimulative effects of the ITC. Taxpayers
eligible for the benefits of this incentive were required to select among two
alternatives, these choices being designed to decrease the aggregate tax deductions
afforded. They were: (1) a basis reduction equal to one-half the amount of the
ITC75 or (2) in exchange for full depreciation allowances, a reduced 1TC credit. 6
The effective ITC rate adjustment resulting from this policy alteration is thought to
be minimal at best.

/d at 286.
71
/d at 293-94.
72
Recovery Act of 1981, supra note 10, §§ 201-14.
73
Prior to ACRS depreciation standards, an asset's depreciable life was established by the taxpayer
through reference to his particular tax situation and utilization of the asset. An ITC was granted to
qualifying assets based on their respective taxpayer identified life with no credit allowed for assets with a
taxpayer identified useful life less than three years. Under the statutory provisions of ACRS, three
categories of depreciable assets were defined: three-, five-, and ten-year property. Each category was
granted an ITC with a reduced credit available for assets falling into the three-year group. Thus, while
taxpayers were no longer permitted latitude for identifying an asset's depreciable life, all long-lived
personalty now qualified and earned the ITC.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
5
Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 205(a)(1)(q)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 333.
Id § 205(a)(1)(q)(4), 96 Stat. 324, 333.
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Second Repeal: January1, 1986
On May 29, 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed the most extensive
renovation of the federal income tax system since codification of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. 77 The changes proposed ran the gamut from fairness and
compassion to simplicity and efficiency. Ultimately, many of the numerous
thought-provoking changes became law and the tax code, accordingly, was
renamed the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.,8
A major focus of the President's tax proposal was upon the perceived "taxinduced distortions" generated by some investment incentives: principally, ACRS
depreciation and the ITC. By means of justification for ITC repeal, the
Administration stated:
The investment tax credit was originally introduced and has been
modified to serve two principal purposes--to prevent capital
consumption allowances based on historical cost from being eroded
by inflation and to stimulate increased levels of investment. Under
current law, the investment tax credit, in combination with the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("ACRS") provides investment
incentives that are neither systematically protected from inflation nor
allocated in a neutral or efficient manner....
The investment tax credit is ...

excessively "front-loaded." The

one-time, up-front credit makes possible the sheltering of an
investor's unrelated income. Thus, the investment tax credit is a
standard element of numerous tax shelter offerings ....
The front-loading of the credit also limits its incentive effect for
start-up, fast-growing or currently unprofitable businesses.
The capital formation objectives for which the investment credit was
adopted would be better served under

. . .

a new Capital Cost

Recovery System ("CCRS"). Investment incentives would be built
into depreciation allowances in a manner that would be inflationproof, relatively neutral across assets, and distributed more evenly
over the life of the investment.
[A]lthough the concept of the investment tax credit is
straightforward, the applicable statutory provisions are exceedingly

77

H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).

'M

Reform Act of 1986, supra note 11, § 2(a).
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complex. Repeal of the credit would substantially simplify the tax
system .... 79
Therefore, as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 8' the ITC was revoked for the
second time.
SiGincANr EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS

Empirical research concentrates on the explanation and prediction of
occurrences in the real world. In specific, empirical tax policy research investigates
the economic consequences of tax policy choices: Is the desired goal a natural byproduct of the chosen policy? In the ITC policy arena, choices involving
enactment, rate changes, and repeal are predicated on the belief that allowance, as
well as rate increases, stimulates investment activity, whereas repeal will have a
dampening effect. Hence, the empirical question concerning ITC effectiveness
becomes: Does the ITC existence, rate increase, or repeal alter investment behavior
of targeted investors and, most importantly, in the direction presumed by the
chosen policy?
1

Economists' EmpiricalResearch

The patriarchs of econometric research in regard to the ITC effectiveness
issue were Hall and Jorgenson (1967, 1969, 1971). 82 In their initial study, they
formulated an investment model based on neoclassical econometric theory. Under
certain restrictive conditions, their empirical tests of ITC effectiveness led them to
conclude that ITC:
policy has been highly effective in changing the level and timing as
well as the composition of investment expenditures. The
investment tax credit, which was limited to certain equipment,
shifted investment away from structures and toward equipment.
Thus, changes in tax policy are said to have substantially stimulated
the level of investment expenditures.

9
RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, ANDS IMPLICITY 160-61 (1985).
80
Reform Act of 1986, supra note 11, § 1.

81 A detailed discussion of the numerous economic theories developed to explain investment behavior
is beyond the scope of this article. As such, the economic theory utilized in each study is briefly noted
and the interested reader desiring a more complete presentation of the economic foundations is directed to
the respective articles.
82
Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 391
(1967); Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Reply And FurtherResults, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1969);
and Application of the Theory of Optimal CapitalAccumulation, TAX INCENTIVES AND CAPITAL SPENDING
9 (Gary Fromm, ed. Brookings Institution 1971).
8
Supra note 17, at 11.
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While Bischoff (1971)81 presents evidence in support of the conclusions of Hall
and Jorgenson, Coen (1968, 1969)85 and Eisner (1969, 1973, 1975)86 assume
positions of opposition. Coen criticizes the use of a Cobb-Douglas production
function which imposes a unity substitution elasticity between labor and capital.
He states that "[n]either their results nor their procedures stand up to close scrutiny,
and their study must therefore be regarded as inconclusive with respect to the
effectiveness of tax incentives .... ,87 Eisner concurs: "[T]he conclusions of Hall
and Jorgenson are based on assumption, not empirical evidence; analysis of the
empirical data, including basic data made available by Jorgenson, do little to
confirm the... 'effectiveness of tax policy in altering investment behavior."'8
Additionally, Coen and Eisner offer alternative models of the investment function
which "suggest that the performance of tax incentives has been disappointing."89
These initial econometric studies and their results were dependent upon the
investment model selected by a particular researcher, reflecting the fact that
economists did not have one generally agreed upon model of investment behavior.
Such model disagreement severely limited these initial economic studies - a
discord which remains unresolved to this date.9° Conflicting results and no
consensus on the ITC effectiveness issue were the expected and realized outcomes.
DissertationResearch in the 1970s
An abundance of dissertation research has been conducted on the issue of
ITC effectiveness. Wilson (1972), investigating at both the micro- and macro economic levels, found that the ITC had no significant effect on capital equipment
expenditures. 91 Questionnaire research was used by Stout (1977) to deduce that
the ITC had a positive effect on capital investment. Wunder (1978) employed
84 Charles W. Bischoff, The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions,TAX INCENTIVES AND CAPITAL
SPENDING 61 (Gary Fromm, ed. Brookings Institution 1971).
85 Robert M. Coen, Effects of Tax Policy on Investment in Manufacturing, 58 AM ECON. REV. 200
(1968); and Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Comment, 59 AM ECON. REV. 370 (1969).
'Y
Robert Eisner, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Comment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 379 (1969); Tax
Incentives for Investment, 26 NATL TAX 1 397 (1973); and Tax Policy and Investment: An Analysis of
Survey Responses," 65 AM ECON. REV. 206 (1975).
g7 Robert Coen, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Comment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 370, 378 (1969).
88 Robert Eisner, Tax Policy and Investment Behavior: Comment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 379 (1969).
89 Robert Coen, Effects of Tax Policy on Investment in Manufacturing, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 200, 210
(1968).
gO
Dale W. Jorgenson, Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior: A Study, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1,111 (1971); Daniel T. Waltz, Bias in Systems of Survey and Econometric Forecasts, 10 J. MACROECON.
261 (1988).
91 Harold Wilson, A Study of the Influence of the Investment Tax Credit Upon Capital Investments
From 1962 to 1969 (1972) (unpublished D. Bus. Admin. dissertation, University of Colorado), abstracted in
33 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL 1269-A (Xerox Univ. Microfilms Oct. 1972).
9
Gary R. Stout, Tax Policy and Capital Formation: An Empirical Analysis of the Potential
Differential Impact of the Investment Tax Credit (1977) (unpublished D. Bus. Admin. dissertation,
University of Southern California), abstracted in 38 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL 4903-A (Univ.
Microfilms Int'l Feb. 1978).
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the Hall and Jorgenson model to study firm level investment behavior revealing
that a significant relationship exists between the ITC and investments. 9 Linear
multiple regression was applied at the micro-economic level by Foster (1978),
resulting in a conclusion that the impact of the ITC on investment is not
significant. 91
A Compendium on EmpiricalResearch
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in response to a Carter
Administration proposal that the ITC be made permanent, 5 undertook a review
and evaluation of prior inquiries concerning the ITC. Specifically, GAO (1978)
was designed to "assess the investment tax credit as a tool [in] stabilizing the
economy in the short-run and as a contributor to long-term economic growth." 96 It
concludes that the ITC has been ineffective as both a countercyclical and prolonged
growth policy instrument. 97
However, GAO (1978) is incomplete for two reasons: (1) It fails to
assimilate all of the relevant and timely economists' research presented heretofore;
and (2) no dissertation endeavors available at that time, as described and discussed
below, were incorporated. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from this study are
clearly without the benefit of the universe of empirical literature and, as such, are of
limited value.
DissertationResearch in the 1980s
Maloney (1984)9 introduces a unique two-stage research methodology into
the domain of tax policy studies: multiple regression succeeded by time-series
intervention analysis. Multiple regression was utilized to isolate variance in the
dependent variable (ITC qualified acquisitions) into explainable and residual
components through analysis of a set of economic independent variables. Timeseries intervention procedures evaluated the attributable effect concomitant with
ITC policy alterations via an analytical consideration of the resulting residuals
combined with an appropriate legislative chronometry. The findings offer solid
support for effectiveness of the ITC - qualified investment spending was

98
Haroldene F. Wunder, Capital Formation and the Investment Tax Credit: An Empirical Study (1978)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina), abstracted in 39 DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INTL 6192-A (Univ. Microfilms Int'l Apr. 1979).
9$
Cecil G. Foster, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of the Potential Differential Impact of the Investment
Tax Credit on Investment in Capital Goods (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia),
abstracted in 42 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTL 2205-A (Univ. Microfilms Int'l Nov. 1981).
9
INVESTMENTTAX CREDIT: UNRESOLVED ISSUES, supra note 17, at 1.

9'
7
98

Id at 4.
Id at 31-33.
Maloney, supra note 22.
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stimulated by enactment in 1962 and further enhanced through the rate increase of
1975. 99
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 100 enacted the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System and liberalized the requirements for the ITC (an effective rate
increase). These tax policy modifications were instituted to invigorate capital
spending and their presumed effects provide the hypotheses for Coldwell
(1986).10 1 Two tax variables, ITC and depreciation, were examined with the
results suggesting that neither tax policy alteration had a significant impact upon
investment spending. 102
The most recent study on ITC effectiveness, a comprehensive evaluation of
the various policy options surrounding the ITC, was undertaken in Rosacker
(1988).103 Univariate Box-Jenkins time-series intervention analyses were tested
for three policy alternatives involving six timeframes: enactment (1962, 1971), rate
increase (1975, 1981), and repeal (1969, 1986). The findings support positive
effects for the enactments (1962, 1971) and for the actual rate increase (1975);
negative effects are attested to for the repeals (1969, 1986); and no support was
offered for a positive effect accompanying codification of ACRS of depreciation
(1981). 104 It was concluded, therefore, that tax policy respecting the ITC has been
efficacious in modifying targeted investment behavior. 105
SUMMARY

Tax legislators have actively modified policy surrounding the ITC during the
first thirty years of its existence. While the encouragement and discouragement of
a designated activity is logically satisfying in a normative sense, tests of empirical
facts are required to substantiate the presumed effects. This article presented, first,
the logical arguments in support of revisions in ITC policy through a review of
legislative intent, and second, a discussion on the important empirical research in
regard to the issue of 1TC effectiveness.

9
Id., at Abstract.
1OO Recovery Act of 1981, supra note 10, Pub. L. No. 97-34 § 204-14, 95 Stat. 172, 222-32.
101 Susan G. Coldwell, ERTA as an Investment Stimulus: A Micro-Based Analysis of Firm Investment
Behavior (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Houston), abstracted in 47 DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INTL 3474-A (Univ. Microfilsm Int'l Mar. 1987).
102 id
103 Robert E. Rosacker, A Box-Jenkins Time-Series Interruption Analysis Concerning United States
Federal Tax Policy: An Empirical Examination of the Investment Tax Credit (1988) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Nebraska). See also Robert E. Rosacker & Richard W. Metcalf, ADVANCES IN
TAX'N, forthcoming Vol. 5, Aug. 1993.
104 Id. at 80-120.
'05 Id. at 126-27.
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The normative evidence in support of ITC effectiveness is, from a legal
standpoint, "beyond a reasonable doubt." In fact, it is very difficult to envision a
cogent argument in opposition to the ITC as an effective means of prompting
targeted investment behavior. On the empirical side, the findings have not been so
clear. While two econometric research authors disagreed with Hall and
Jorgenson's position supporting ITC effectiveness, the majority of the evidence
sustained their position. Dissertation research directed at this issue was divided but
weighted toward support of a directional effect accompanying the various policy
alternatives. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the empirical research
supports a finding of "clear and convincing" proof that the ITC is an effective tax
policy tool.
Throughout its history, the resilient nature of the ITC has become
increasingly evident. It is rather certain that the "coup de grace" has not yet been
delivered to this tax credit. Indeed, this tax policy is an excellent means for
influencing targeted investment behavior and the Congress would be well advised
to consider employing such an effective tool when necessary.
Since the ITC was originally enacted in 1962, it has been
temporarily terminated from October 10, 1966 to March 9, 1967
and from April 18, 1967 to August 15, 1971. In both cases, the
ITC was reinstated primarily because the lack of incentive for
companies to invest in property, plant, and equipment had an
adverse economic impact. If the ITC is repealed [as it subsequently
would be in the Tax Reform Act of 1986], it is possible that it will
be only temporary, since the economic implications have historically
caused its reenactment.146

106

Thomas A. Rowles, Investment Tax Credit Studies, 1986 CORP. AcCT. 77.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992

19

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 9 [1992], Art. 4

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol9/iss1/4

20

